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 C H A P T E R  O N E 
 Introduction:  Soft Power, Public Diplomacy, 
and Democratization 
 Nicholas J.   Cull and 
 Francisco J.   Rodr  í  guez  
 “Inf luence can persuade, but power can compel.” 
 Hans J. Morgenthau, 1948. 1 
 “Is our power such, that anything we do is a form of intervention?” 
 Allen Guttman, 1963. 2 
 Among the stories told by the ancient Greek slave and sometime dip-
lomat Aesop is a fable that neatly illuminates the nature of power. 
In the story the North Wind and the Sun argue as to who was more 
powerful and resolve to test their strength by competing to remove a 
cloak from a traveler. The North Wind blew his iciest blast but only 
succeeded in making the traveler wrap himself more tightly in his 
cloak, however, when the sun shone the traveler happily removed his 
cloak. This illustration of the power of friendly persuasion appealed 
to the ancients and their interpreters down the years. The debate is 
not theoretical. In our own world international actors regularly face 
the challenge of ideologically antithetical regimes—for democracies 
these are typically dictatorships—and wrestle with the best approach 
to promote change. Today that debate is often couched as a choice 
between hard and soft power. 
 These issues were a regular concern of US foreign policy through-
out the twentieth century, from Woodrow Wilson’s approach to 
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revolutionary Mexico down to Bill Clinton’s response to the collapse 
of communism. They remain hardly less moot in the era of the Global 
War on Terror. Historically, the results of US democracy promotion 
have been mixed and explanations of the place of the process among 
America’s priorities, contradictory. 3 Given the contemporary emphasis 
on the issue—at the time of writing it—is central to the discussion 
of approaches to numerous countries including Cuba 4 and Iran—it is 
doubly important to understand what has gone before. This anthology 
of historical research will examine and evaluate one of the most impor-
tant cases of democratization—that of postwar Spain—and consider 
the extent to which the United States was able to use the tools of public 
diplomacy and soft power to contribute to one of the most remarkable 
examples of a democratic transition. It is of special significance as it 
opens much of the scholarship of that case to English language audi-
ences for the first time. 
 Before jumping into the historical overview, it is necessary to give a 
brief explanation of the concepts used in the analysis. 
 Public Diplomacy, Soft Power, and Other Concepts 
 The term  public diplomacy refers to the mechanisms used by an inter-
national actor—whether a government, international organization, 
nongovernmental organization (NGO), or even an individual—to 
advance their foreign policy by engaging foreign publics. These efforts 
to “understand, inform, engage, and inf luence foreign audiences” 5 
have historically included information campaigns, personal contacts, 
and cultural/exchange programs abroad. The term emerged in the 
mid-1960s and was coined by a former US diplomat named Edmund 
Gullion. 6 Its practice required a radical rethinking of foreign policy 
practice. Traditional diplomacy had always been directed at other gov-
ernments and their agents and tended to require absolute secrecy, but 
public diplomacy is by its nature open and requires a greater degree of 
transparency to f lourish. 7 
 Public diplomacy began in Gullion’s mind as a euphemism for pro-
paganda and for some observers has never lost that pejorative taint. 8 
However, public diplomacy as a practice has evolved beyond its origins. 
The Dutch scholar Jan Melissen notes:
 Public diplomacy is similar to propaganda in that it tries to per-
suade people what to think, but it is fundamentally different from 
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it in the sense that public diplomacy also listens to what people 
have to say. 9 
 One can go further and note that historically propaganda has typi-
cally been deployed for a fixed end, over a short period of time, with 
a high level of intensity. The main objective is to obtain an immediate 
benefit. It is not seen as a way to comprehend or engage with a target 
group, but simply to convince. When propagandists listen, they listen 
only to target their messages more effectively. Public diplomacy is (or 
should be) different. While its practitioners seek to export culture or 
information, they are also open to receiving culture and information 
from others by way of exchange. Public diplomacy does not always 
know the end of its policy: its objective might be to discover what its 
foreign policy ought to be, an exercise that has no parallel in propa-
ganda. It is easier to make these distinctions in theory than in practice: 
the line separating the two can become thin especially in the minds of 
those paying the bill, who in the US at least historically have shown 
little interest in learning from others. Frank Stanton, an American 
media executive and advocate for the reform of public diplomacy, 
stated matters succinctly when he complained in 1968: “Congress 
wants propaganda.” 10 
 The convenience of the single-term public diplomacy conceals the 
multiple divisions within its practice. In the first instance public diplo-
macy may be segmented by time between (1) short-term daily (or even 
“real-time” instant) communication, (2) medium-term strategic com-
munication, and (3) long-term exchanges and intercultural relations. 11 
One of the present coauthors has argued that in its classic form public 
diplomacy can be divided into five core elements: (1) listening (tracking 
foreign public opinions), (2) advocacy of a specific policy, (3) cultural 
diplomacy, (4) exchange diplomacy, and (5) international broadcasting. 
These elements work over different periods of time: listening, advo-
cacy, and broadcasting being short term; culture being medium term; 
and exchange working in the long term. 12 To complicate matters fur-
ther, each of these elements has a different source of credibility and 
requires a different kind of infrastructure. Historically, the different 
elements of a country’s public diplomacy have found co-location dif-
ficult and work best when mutually insulated by clear firewalls or even 
housed in separate agencies as has generally been the case in European 
public diplomacy. 
 In recent years the practice and study of public diplomacy has been 
inextricably linked to the concept of  soft power coined by Joseph Nye, 
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meaning an actor’s ability to make progress in world affairs by means 
of cultural or political attraction rather than resorting to military or 
economic coercion. In terms of the famous metaphor of the child 
motivating a donkey with either a carrot or a stick, military pressure 
is the stick and the economic leverage of bribes is the carrot. Both are 
hard power, hinging on the capacity of the actor (in this case the child) 
to muster actual resources. For the metaphor to extend to the realm 
of soft power, the child would have to be able to motivate the donkey 
by repeating a stirring story of how happy donkeys are on his or her 
farm—singing a song about how any donkey on his farm gets to feel 
like an Arabian thoroughbred or showing the donkey a movie with 
the same message. Of course, the metaphor breaks down, but why 
should a metaphor which fits farm animals extend to human beings 
with their unique capacity to analyze and imagine alternate futures? 
In the real world actors need mechanisms to communicate their soft 
power virtues to international audiences. Those mechanisms require 
real resources but those resources are not the sole determinant of their 
effectiveness that hinges on the appeal of the culture and values that 
they communicate. Public diplomacy provides the mechanism by 
which international actors communicate their culture and values to an 
international audience. 
 Nye believes that any given country may possess greater or lesser 
reserves of soft power, depending on the attractiveness of its political 
system and behavioral rules, its economic system, its education, its artis-
tic representations, its cuisine, or even its sport. The British Council 
develops the concept on its website:
 A country’s soft power is its ability to make friends and inf luence 
people not through military might, but through its most attractive 
assets, notably culture, education, language and values. In short, 
it’s the things that make people love a country rather than fear 
it, things that are often the products of people, institutions and 
brands rather than governments. 13 
 Soft power has limitations. It is not a magic wand for the conduct 
of international affairs. No international actor can function exclusively 
by charming the citizens of the world. Nye himself concedes that soft 
power is difficult to quantify and handle. 14 The results depend on the 
reactions of foreign audiences that are often slow to emerge, and are 
usually prone to rapid variations, not always motivated by logic. 15 For 
this reason the British scholar Ali Fisher has written of soft power and 
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public diplomacy in terms of their generating a general atmosphere of 
favorable understanding, which can exert an indirect inf luence over 
certain future events by shortening “the odds of certain behaviors 
or events occurring.” 16 Finally, it is worth recalling that soft power 
resources are easily lost. Nye has noted how readily the incautious 
application of hard power erodes even the most established reserves of 
soft power. The stories of torture at Guantanamo Bay and pictures of 
torture at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq eradicated years of patient accu-
mulation of soft power by US diplomats. 17 
 There is no shortage of voices endorsing hard power at the expense of 
soft. Think of Stalin’s famous dismissal of the inf luence of the Vatican: 
“The Pope? How many divisions does he have?” 18 Machiavelli—a 
favorite source for advocates of hard power—was actually more cir-
cumspect, warning that a prince must work tirelessly every day to be 
loved by his subjects but need not do anything at all to be hated, and 
that while it is easier to make oneself feared than loved, the efficacy of 
the former approach diminishes over time. 19 In addition, it goes with-
out saying that the strategy of fear is harder to implement in a modern 
democratic environment where brutalities and excesses of power are so 
readily relayed by social media. 
 The reality is that hard and soft power are not mutually exclusive and 
function best in concert: the concept that Nye dubbed “smart power” 
and that was much used during Hillary Clinton’s tenure as Secretary of 
State. 20 This interdependence is not new. Historically, it is the deficien-
cies of hard power that have compelled international actors to embrace 
soft power in the first place, as Jan Melissen has observed:
 Most successful public diplomacy initiatives were born out of 
necessity. They were reactive and not the product of forward-
looking foreign services caring about relationships with foreign 
audiences as a new challenge in diplomatic practice. 21 
 A significant example of this reactive public diplomacy sits at the 
heart of the case considered in this book. When in 1959 Presdient 
Eisenhower embraced General Franco, he provoked the hostility in 
the minds of anti-Franco Spaniards. Many questioned how the same 
America that presented itself as a champion of democracy could ally 
with a violent dictator. As we shall see in the following chapters, 
Washington deployed numerous soft-power initiatives in Spain in an 
attempt to explain that contradiction, and if possible resolve it by pro-
moting democratization. 
Copyrighted material – 9781137461445
Copyrighted material – 9781137461445
Nicholas J. Cull and Francisco J. Rodríguez6
 External Inf luence on the Spanish Transition 
 The near-unanimous appreciation of the specialists in highlight-
ing the relevance of internal factors as opposed to those stem-
ming from the international context, in accounting for Spain’s 
Transition to democracy, has led to the exclusion of these interna-
tional factors from the debate. (Manuel Redero, 1994) 22 
A transition of such magnitude does not occur in complete isolation 
( . . . ) although the transition took place in Spain, it was helped along 
and driven forward by external forces. (Frances Lannon, 2005) 23 
 Initially, historians examining the transformation of the Franco dic-
tatorship into a democratic system focuses on the domestic political 
process and suggested that external factors played only an indirect and 
marginal role. 24 Since the mid-1990s, this view has been revised in the 
light of studies paying more attention to the external aspects/inf luences 
that might have undermined the legitimacy of the Franco regime. 25 
The first steps on this new historiographical path were dominated by 
the emphasis on military hard power concerns, including the geopo-
litical competition on the Mediterranean coast during the early 1970s 
and impact of  d é tente . 26 Many scholars have neglected the soft power 
factors of external ideology and culture. This anthology aims to help 
remedy that by answering two core questions: To what extent did the 
various US Public diplomacy campaigns deployed in Spain during the 
Franco dictatorship contribute to the process of democratization? If 
not a principal driver, can those soft power effects be understood as a 
kind of “fertilizer for democracy” preparing the ground in which the 
domestic experiment with democracy could f lourish? 
 While previous publications have focused on the involvement of 
the US government in the Spanish transition during the period 1975–
1978, this book adopts a longer-term approach, beginning with the 
end of World War II. Given that the fruits of public diplomacy often 
ripen slowly, it is misleading to evaluate its efficacy by examining 
only a short period of time. Those who have adopted the short-term 
perspective, or who focused their attention on the military aspects of 
the Spain/US relationship, have concluded: “The United States’ main 
concern with regard to Spain in the early 1970s was the defense of 
their [U.S.] geostrategic interests ( . . . ) the promotion of democracy 
was a secondary aspect—an important one, but a secondary one nev-
ertheless.” Trying to contextualize the American position more fairly, 
they assert, however, that European governments also failed to place 
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democratization before stability in Spain, and much less before their 
own national interests. 27 
 European inf luence in Spain makes an interesting counterpoint to 
that of the United States. The inf luence of the Common Market coun-
tries as they were at the time was not exercised directly; instead, it 
was typically exercised through political parties or foundations. 28 The 
change in direction came in the wake of the revolutionary events in 
Portugal in April 1974. European and American diplomats feared a 
repetition in Madrid of the events in Lisbon, which seems to bear out 
Melissen’s idea of “reactive public diplomacy.” The role of Europe in 
promoting Spanish democracy has received more scholarly attention. 
Key questions include whether Brussels served as a magnet and encour-
agement for the anti-Franco forces? Whether the European democ-
racies became a concave mirror, which magnified the blemishes on 
the face of the Franco dictatorship by comparison? Whether European 
prosperity attracted the people of Spain toward change? We can also 
ask if Europe’s effort to promote political liberalization in Spain sur-
passed that of the United States? Such questions still require further 
research. 29 
 The Contributions to This Book 
 Giles Scott-Smith’s  chapter two covers the period from the 1950s to 
the end of the Cold War with a f lash-forward to the Arab Spring of 
2011, and considers the role of democracy promotion within US for-
eign policy. Scott-Smith examines the highs, lows, and contradictions 
of that process, not the least being its incompatibility with America’s 
recurring tendency to isolationism. The author wonders whether or 
not the means and strategies to promote democracy deployed by the 
State of the Department all over the globe have been consistently dem-
ocratic. Put differently: did the American self-perception of being a 
Messianic forerunner of democracy clash with the unembellished real-
ity of a superpower ready to work with a repressive dictatorship, as 
in the case of Spain? Were the short-term anomalies always absorbed 
by the long-term narrative? Scott-Smith argues that while the United 
States presented itself as a beacon of freedom, it was not always seen that 
way by those at the receiving end of that beacon’s light. The Spanish 
case also raises the issue of anti-Americanism rife on both in the right 
and the left of the political spectrum, which challenged the successful 
delivery of US public diplomacy’s messages. Scott-Smith also ref lects 
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the degree of autonomy and relative importance of public diplomacy 
within the US foreign policy machinery, all of which serves as a neces-
sary background to the particularities of the Spanish case. 
 Rosa Pardo (in  chapter three ) enlarges the framework by probing 
the way in which United States communicated with Portugal and 
Spain during the Cold War. Both Iberian dictatorships were anchored 
in similar ideological roots of Catholicism and anticommunism, but 
there were significant dissimilarities too. From the very beginning, 
the special–historical connection between Portugal and Great Britain 
set the case apart from Spain with the hostility between Madrid and 
London caused by the Gibraltar issue. World War II played out differ-
ently for the two countries. Franco’s proclivity toward the Axis was 
not matched by Salazar. This and the strategic value of the Portuguese 
islands of Azores insured that the Portuguese dictatorship received 
a more benevolent treatment than the Spanish one. Portugal joined 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, while Spain 
had to wait until 1986; Portugal befitted from the  Marshall Plan and 
expanded its international alliances through bilateral engagement with 
France; and West Germany in exchange for a German airbase in Beja 
(1963). Spain signed a military pact with United States in 1953, but it 
was by Executive Agreement only and not approved by Congress as 
a Treaty until 1976. Pardo’s essay addresses the question: Did the US 
government prioritize strategic factors over ideological considerations, 
such as consistency in defending democratic values in other Western 
European countries or the other way around? 
 Lorenzo Delgado’s  chapter (number four) discusses how US public 
diplomacy tried to solve the difficult equation of justifying an alliance 
between the main democracy of the world and a dictatorship forged 
in a bloody civil war. Franco’s political longevity allowed plenty of 
opportunities for the United States to adjust its approach to the Spanish 
tyrant. At first the United States prioritized engagement with the rul-
ing classes, who controlled the country and sustained the dictator-
ship. In the mid-1960s, a more balanced strategy emerged, shifting 
the approach to the emerging middle classes and opposition sectors, 
students and trades unions, but without alienating the Franco establish-
ment. Delgado explains how this new outlook was easier to imagine 
than its implementation, especially during an era of widespread global 
public revulsion against the US conduct of the Vietnam War. In these 
circumstances, the hope of winning popular acceptance in Spain was 
relegated to second place behind the need to preserve the advantageous 
terms access to US military bases in the country. 
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 During the final stages of Franco regime, Washington relied on 
policy of calculated ambiguity: “to avoid involvement, while main-
taining sufficient f lexibility to protect our interests.” 30 This political 
balancing act sought to maintain cordial relations with Francoist elites, 
without distancing the United States too much from opposition, and 
by doing so prepare for the political change that time (and Franco’s 
advanced age) would inevitably bring. Delgado concludes that, in the 
short term at least, this public diplomacy failed. Anti-Franco Spaniards 
read America’s light touch as a lack of commitment to the restoration 
of democracy in Spain. 
 Pablo León-Aguinaga’s contribution ( chapter five ) examines the mes-
sages of democracy promotion and democratization deployed by US 
public diplomats in Spain during and immediately after the Franco 
dictatorship. León-Aguinaga argues that even if democratization was 
not the foremost American objective, the promotion of democracy 
remained a significant theme of US engagement with the Spanish pub-
lic. American messages fell, like a persistent drizzle, onto the Spanish 
political scene, eulogizing rights, elections, free political parties, and 
debate in an attempt to saturate Spanish public (following the idea of 
public diplomacy acting as a “fertilizer for democracy”) with a sense of 
what a political system should be, even without explicitly pointing out 
Franco’s obscuring of such a system. We may ask why greater impor-
tance was not given to those messages? Why did the US take a low 
profile? Or stepping back from the Spanish case, why was US public 
diplomacy so seldom prioritized within the US foreign policy appara-
tus? It was not until the death of Franco and the arrival of the Carter 
administration that the United States Information Agency’s messages 
were more openly committed with the democratization in Spain. León-
Aguinaga points to a watershed memo in October 1977 which empha-
sized the need to “give serious support to the democratization process 
in Spain, while stressing the viability of American pluralistic society by 
highlighting U.S. Political, social and economic achievements.” 31 
 One of the challenges facing the United States through the post-
war period was Europe’s resistance to the spread of US culture, often 
labelled as cultural anti-Americanism. USIA and the Cultural Bureau 
of the Department of State responded by promoting American Studies 
in European classrooms. Francisco J. Rodr í guez’s  chapter (number 
six) examines that “Cultural Cold War mission” in Spain, analyzing 
initiatives including work to promote a “balanced” view of the US 
History, Poetry, Art, or Literature in their own right rather than as a 
byproduct of British Culture or low-quality imitations of European 
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cultural achievements. Rodriguez directs attention to English teach-
ing and American Studies programs within the Spanish university sys-
tem, mainly funded by the Fulbright Commission and the US–Spanish 
Non-Military Agreements of 1970: the two main channels by which 
American Studies were promoted among Spanish citizens. American 
Studies in Spain emerge as a soft-power maneuver designed both to 
produce greater sympathy toward US leadership and to reduce the anti-
Americanism of the Spanish people, which was one of the most intense 
rejections of the United States anywhere in Europe. 
 When rethinking the impact of public diplomacy on postwar Spain, 
it makes sense to also consider the question of the Franco regime’s 
own use of public diplomacy and soft power. Neal Rosendorf ’s illumi-
nating essay ( chapter seven ) explores how the dictator tried to engage 
with international audiences to counter the legacy of his “dangerous 
friendship” with Hitler and Mussolini. His objective was to sell the idea 
that his was merely an authoritarian regime and not a totalitarian one. 
Franco promoted a narrative of modernization and economic growth. 
He relied on three pillars: tourism, filmmaking, and public relations. 
Rosendorf ’s analysis contests the notion that Spain emerged with a new 
modern image fully formed in the late 1980s. Spain’s national rebrand-
ing effort did not begin from scratch with Franco’s death. It began in 
the immediate aftermath of World War II and ran through the end of 
the 1960s, with its apotheosis the very expensive and highly successful 
Spanish pavilion at the New York World’s Fair of 1964–1965. 
 Public diplomacy is built from personal relationships so it is fitting 
that the final chapter is a personal ref lection on US public diplomacy 
in Spain by a distinguished practitioner, Ambassador Mark Asquino. 
Asquino began as a visiting lecturer in 1975 in Spain but went on 
to serve as director of the US Cultural Center/Washington Irving 
Library (1982–1984) and then as US Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer 
(1984–1986) in Madrid. His memoir is frank on the objectives of US 
cultural engagement, including prompting young Spaniards to develop 
the c ritical thinking skills on which any successful democracy depends. 
His recollections affirm the value of some of the best-known elements 
of US public diplomacy including the International Visitor Leadership 
Program (IVLP) and music diplomacy. 
 The conclusion by Lorenzo Delgado ( chapter nine ) looks back over 
the essays, reviewing the geopolitical priorities of the US foreign 
policy in Spain and role of public diplomacy. He considers especially 
the impact of the stark inconsistency between US government rheto-
ric and US government action in Spain. Delgado questions whether 
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public diplomacy can reconcile the contractions of this. It is plain that 
US democratization efforts were uneven and suffered many ups and 
downs. The ambiguity of the US foreign policy was maintained until 
the end of the Franco regime. The centrality of the strategic factor and 
collaboration with the dictatorship undermined the consistency and 
credibility of the American democratic message. As to the ultimate 
issue of whether or not the US promotion of democracy was a determi-
nant factor in Spain’s change, a comprehensive answer would require 
comparison with the French, German, or CEE efforts in this regard. 
This volume chooses to leave the issue open. 
 What does this collection mean for US diplomacy today? One mes-
sage is that it is clear from these essays that elements of public diplomacy 
are impactful forms of soft power, especially leader programs and edu-
cational initiatives. Secondly, it is evident that the democratic ideas on 
which the United States is founded are inherently powerful and attrac-
tive and serve to build expectations of American behavior; however, the 
ideas their raw form doesn’t come with caveat about strategic priorities 
that leaves the United States vulnerable to falling short of its own stan-
dards (as was the case with the race question in this period). Thirdly, it is 
obvious that American inconsistency (or hypocrisy) in democratization 
is a significant problem. There was a cost to the US image in Spain and 
beyond when the country failed to support democratization in Spain and 
simply supported General Franco. This might be imagined as negative 
soft power—behavior that not only fails to attract but actively repels. 
Democratization emerges as an activity that by its nature recommends 
the best methods for its perpetuation. As peace is hard to secure by war, 
so democracy, whether in the Spain of the 1970s or the Middle East of 
today, is best advanced by discussion and not dictation. 
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